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of it will be lost to taxes.20 The court apparently was persuaded that the
better view is to consider the instruction a matter of judicial discretion.2 1
Though the writer believes that the decision in this case is correct,
certain closely related questions remain undecided in Florida. For example,
should a jury be instructed as to the taxability of income derived from an
award? 22 Further, should the plaintiff's earnings before or after taxes be considered the basis for the computation of damages for loss of future earnings?23 It would be better to attack this area as a whole and propose
solutions that would dispose of all these related problems. Despite this
shortcoming, the decision represents a beginning in a more realistic approach
to a recurrent problem.
HERBERT STETTIN

ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION

UNDER THE FDHSA

The administrator of an estate filed suit in a state court, seeking recovery
under the Federal Death on the High Seas Act' for the decedent's death
which resulted from an airplane accident on the high seas. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction under the act was exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. 2 From a
denial of this motion, the defendant appealed. Held, affirmed: absent a
clear congressional intent to the contrary, the FDHSA does not withdraw

20. Id. at 275.
21. Poirer v. Shireman, 129 So.2d 439, 444-45 (Fla. App. 1961). The instruction
was taken from the Missouri Supreme Court's sample charge in Dempsey v. Thompson,
363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952), which reads as follows: "You are
instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any award is
made, is not subject to Federal or State income taxes, and you should not consider
such taxes in fixing the amount of any award made plaintiff, if any you make."
22. See, e.g., Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 1 Il. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E.2d
914 (1954); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
23. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H., & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl. 178 F.2d 497 (8th
Cir. 1949); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949 , rehearing
granted, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Runnels v. City of Douglas, 124 F. Supp.
657 (D. Alaska 1954); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
In addition, there are several law review articles on this point, representative of which
is Daniels, Measure of Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 7 MIAMI L. Q. 171,
175-77 (1953).
1. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as
FDHSA).
2. Original jurisdiction in all civil cases of admiralty lies in the United States
district courts. This jurisdiction is separate and distinct from other civil cases tried
by these courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1958). Cases are usually tried in an admiralty
court by a judge sitting without a jury. The purported generosity of jury verdicts
must, in all probability, contribute to the desire on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys
to obtain trial in other than an admiralty forum.
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jurisdiction from courts which previously have entertained actions of this
nature. Section 7 of the act,3 which states that "the provisions of any state
statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall
not be affected by this chapter," must be interpreted to allow for the enforcement of the substantive rights accorded by it through the procedural
medium of a competent state or non-admiralty court. Ledet v. United
Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 176 N.E.2d 820, 219 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1961)..
Prior to 1920, no common law remedy was available for a wrongful
death occuring outside the territorial limits of the United States. Individual
states did in some instances offer relief through their wrongful death or
survival statutes, 4 but often, because of the complexities involved in the
case, a state could not find sufficient nexus to exercise jurisdiction.5 Suitors
would thus, in many cases, be left with a valid claim and no means of
enforcement To fill this gap in the body of maritime law,6 and to unify the
law in its application to maritime matters,7 Congress enacted the FDHSA.8
Strangely enough, the question of which court would have jurisdiction
to hear suits brought under this act was raised even before the law was
enacted." As originally drafted, the statute provided that the rights accorded
by a state statute in wrongful death cases would not be affected "as to
causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any state." 10 This
provision was stricken from the original act by a last-minute amendment.
From the standpoint of legislative intent, this amendment could be construed to mean one of three things: (1) Congress intended to remove jurisdiction under the act from non-admiralty courts entirely; (2) it intended
non-admiralty courts to hear only those cases that arose within state territorial limits; (3) it did not withdraw jurisdiction for wrongful death in any
case in which a state had previously exercised jurisdiction. The first propo-

3. 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1958).
4. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); Southern Pac. Co. v. De Valle Da Costa,
190 Fed. 689 (1st Cir. 1911); Souden v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., 223 Mass. 509,
112 N.E. 82 (1916); McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546, 33 Am. Rep. 664 (1879).
5. For instance in The Harrisburg, the deceased was a resident of Delaware, the
ship was registered in Pennsylvania and the death occurred off the coast of Massachusetts.
The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); See also, The Middlesex, 253 Fed. 142 (D.
Mass. 1916).
6. 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (1920) (remarks of Rep. Volstead). "The bill
is

intended to supply a defect which now exists under what was the common-law rule as
to actions affecting injuries that might be caused through the wrongful act or neglect
of persons engaged in shipping on the high seas."
7. H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1920) ."Section 7 makes the
Act the law of the courts of admiralty of the United States, and, so far as the high
seas are concerned, makes the remedy exclusive. This is for the purpose of uniformity,
as the States cannot properly legislate for the high seas."
8. See note 1 supra.
9. See discussion of proposed bill in 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (1920).
10. Section 7 as originally drafted, and recommended by the committee reads as
follows: "The provisions of any state statute giving or regulating rights of action or
remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action accruing
within the territorial limits of any state." H.R.

4 (1920).

(Emphasis added.)

REP.

No. 674, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
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sition has been completely rejected.'1 As for the latter two, the courts
have developed a definite split of authority. The majority of courts agree
that Congress intended jurisdiction to remain exclusively in admiralty where
the cause of action accrued without the territorial limits of a state.12 For
a number of years no issue was taken with this limitation, and the courts,
without exception, held the sole forum in cases of death on the high seas
to be a court of admiralty. The predominant ratio decidendi in these
cases was based upon a reliance on this congressional intent, which is at
best somewhat obscure. 13 However, in recent years an increasing number
of non-admiralty courts have adopted the third alternative - hearing cases
.under the FDHSA although the. deaths occurred outside their territorial
14
limits.

In Elliot v. Steinfeldt,1'a New York court, in a brief memorandum
opinion, stated simply that the FDHSA does not pre-empt previously exercised state jurisdiction in maritime death actions absent a "distinct manifestation" by Congress to this effect. Since Elliot a number of other courts
have announced this same result, 16 and several have set forth well-reasoned
and convincing opinions. Sierra v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.' 7 involved
the same factual situation as the instant case. Suit was commenced on
the civil side of the United States District Court of Puerto Rico. The
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that because it came
within the purview of the FDHSA, the action was triable solely by the
admiralty side of the court. The motion was denied. The court explained
that the act does not specifically withdraw jurisdiction from non-admiralty
courts, but merely provides another forum in which suit may be brought.
The court stated emphatically that the suit could have been maintained

11. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
12. Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958); Noel
v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); Turner v. Wilson Line, 242
F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1957); Higa v. Transoccan Airlines, 124 F. Supp. 13 (D. Hawaii
1954); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Echavarria v.
Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nay. Co., 10 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); Gordon v.
Reynolds, 187 Cal. App. 2d 507, 10 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); In re Rademaker's Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
13. "At first blush it might seem that in a case like The Hamilton [state wrongful
death statute applied to collision on the high seas prior to the FDHSA] a libel might
still be founded on the [state] . . . death statute . . . . [N]o doubt Section 7 read
in the light of the act as a whole and its legislative history will be construed as a
savings clause to maintain the efficacy of the state acts only in cases of fatal injuries
received in localities not covered by the Federal Act ....
" Magruder & Grout, Wrongful
Death Within the Admiralty jurisdiction, 35 YALE L.I. 395, 422-23 (1926).
14. Sierra v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952);
Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping Co., 53 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Choy v. Pan-Am.
Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App.

Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1938); See also, 1
1940); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY § 16 (1939).

BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY

15. 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1938).
16. See cases cited note 14 supra.
17. 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952).
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in the local courts of Puerto Rico under that territory's wrongful death
statute. As the FDHSA itself did not withdraw jurisdiction from nonadmiralty courts, and because section 7 of the act provides that state
laws giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death are not
affected,18 the court held that jurisdiction would lie in a non-admiralty
court provided the substantive rights and liabilities afforded by the act
were not affected by local law.
It should be noted that before the passage of the FDHSA there were
serious constitutional doubts as to the extent of state power in any segment
of maritime law. This reservation was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,19 in which the Court held that a
state workmen's compensation law, to the extent that it conflicted with
general maritime law, could not be applied in accidents arising from employment which was maritime in nature. 20 As previously indicated, it has
been determined that a state may create a right of action in wrongful death
cases, 2' but exactly how nmch further it may go is not certain. Subsequent
to the Jensen decision, Congress enacted a statute which overrode the rule
of this case. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held this statute unconstitutional as being a delegation of power to states in an area reserved to
Congress by the Constitution.2 2 The only interpretation of this decision
which would explain the vast number of maritime cases brought in other
than admiralty courts is that it forbade only a substantive invasion of maritime law, leaving non-admiralty courts open for the enforcement of the
substantive maritime law.
The position of the instant case is readily sustainable not only from
a constitutional standpoint, but also from a strict and logical interpretation
of the act. The statute states clearly that state laws regulating rights and
remedies for death are not affected by its provisions.2 3 New York entertained a death on the high seas action under its own wrongful death statute
many years-prior to the FDHSA,24 and thus, in the words of the act,
had a remedy which is not affected by its provisions. A literal reading of
the act might be taken to require New ,York 'to apply its own wrongful
18. Federal Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 767
(1958).
19. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
20. "In view of these constitutional provisions and the [savings to suitors clause]
. . it would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the
general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation ....
[W]e think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed
by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law in its international and interstate relations." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
21. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
22. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
23. Federal Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §
767 (1958).
24. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546, 33 Am. Rep. 664 (1879).
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death statute in lieu of the FDHSA. But this interpretation could only
increase the probability that a New York court in hearing the case would
infringe on the substantive rights accorded by the FDHSA. Why then
should a New York tribunal not be allowed to sit as a procedural enforcement medium in judgment of the case under the FDHSA? The only
conclusion which can be reached is that neither the available legislative
history, nor a logical interpretation of the act, appear to demand an admiralty forum. Representative Mann, who propounded the amendment
which struck from the act the provision that state jurisdiction would be
unaffected -only as to causes of action accruing within a state's territorial
limits, expressed his doubts as to where jurisdiction would lie under the
act;25 and in fact some 250 members of the House who voted on the amendment were not present when the discussion on the floor took place.26
No words in the act demand an admiralty forum. It is submitted that
the question in each case should be whether the substantive rights and
liabilities which accrued to the parties on the happening of the event in
litigation will be enforced by recourse to the procedure of the non-admiralty
court in which the suit is filed. It must be remembered that if suit is
brought under the FDHSA in a non-admiralty court, one substantial difference which will be present is the possibility of resort to a jury trial. It
has been argued that the complexities of an admiralty case are too great
to be sifted and weighed intelligently by a jury.27 Whether this or any
other factor will serve to subvert the substantive rights of the FDHSA is
a question that may be settled only by the Supreme Court.
JAMES

H.

SWEENY,

III

STATE COURTROOM DOORS CLOSED TO EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The petitioner was convicted in a state court of knowingly having
had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious
books, pictures, and photographs in violation of a state law.'
The
25. "[M]y impression, which very likely may be erroneous, is that the purpose
of the bill was to confer jurisdiction in certain eases of death where no jurisdiction
now exists. I was under the impression that the bill was not intended to take away
any jurisdiction which can now be exercised by any State court." 59 CONe. REC.
4484 (1920).
26. See 59 CONG. REc. 4486 (1920).
27. Smith, Jury Trials for Admiralty Cases? No! 2 FEn. B. NErws 49 (1954).
1. Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Baldwin 1958). The statute provides in
pertinent part that: "No person shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his
control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, [or] . . . picture ....
"

